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The material base of any state is its treasury. Practically any political reform is about who 
is going to raise funds for the treasury, who will spend it and in what manner. The reform of the 
relations between the federal government and regional governments in the Russian Federation is 
no exception. This reform, known as the “reform of federative relations” will be the theme of my 
report.  
 
 What is the reason for the reform? Are there any obstacles in Russia hindering realization 
of the fundamental principles of federalism, i.e. independence of constituent entities and their 
responsibility for the policies conducted by them?  
 
 Apparently, Russia was to survive two shocks during the last decade: the first was to be 
caused by its move from planned to market economy and the second was to result from 
reconstruction of the relations between the center and the regions. The RSFSR was the only one 
of the Soviet Union republics that had the word “federative” in its name. It also decided to 
realize its meaning in practice.  In political terms, the main aspect of the perestroika was the 
election of not only the representative bodies of power but of the head of the RF representative 
power, in terms of finance it meant fiscal independence of the regions.  
 
 However, the second shock had failed to occur. Most of the elected governors 
demonstrated obedience to the Kremlin and advocated the “strengthening of the vertical 
authority” that also included abandonment of electivity of regional heads. Also, most subnational 
budgets relied on the revenue and expenditure policies of the federal center and behind-the 
scenes agreements on the sizes of grants.  
 
 At the same time, formal indicators look not bad when compared with other federative 
states (see Figure 1). In Russia, the subnational and extra-budgetary funds shares in consolidated 
budget spending are higher than in Germany though lower than in the U.S. and Canada. The 
same pattern applies to the revenues as well.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 When considering the revenue structure in Russia (Figure 1) the shared taxes were regarded as tax revenues rather 
than transfers from the higher governments. 
Figure 1. Distributions of Revenues (before Transfers) and Expenditures Across the Tiers 
of the Budgetary System2   
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Source: Calculations for Germany, USA and Canada are based on the data from the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook, IMF, 1999. In case of the Russian Federation, the data are taken from the budget executions reports of the 
RF, regions and municipals as of January 1, 2002 (RF Ministry of Finance) and budget information of the 
extrabudgetary funds.  
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of Subfederal Revenues and Expenditures in RF Consolidated Budget  
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2 For comparability reasons, the revenue and expenditure structure of the Russian budgetary system included 
revenues and expenditures of the Social Insurance Fund, Obligatory Medical Insurance Fund and Pension Fund.  
The dynamics of the federal and regional shares in the revenues and expenditures of the 
Russian consolidated budget during the latest six years (see Figure 23) demonstrates the revenue 
(before transfers) centralization tendency and lack of stability in allocation of spending 
responsibilities across the tiers of government.  
 
Obviously, the amount of budget funds that goes into a regional budget and is spent by 
regional authorities is an important indicator of their independence. However, spending funds 
does not always mean the discretion to use them and revenue rising does not always prove that a 
region can influence the size of revenues. The given data show only the degree of 
decentralization in service provision and possession of appropriate funds; they provide no 
information on decentralization of legislative regulation in the budgetary sector.  
 
I. Expenditures 
 
According to the CFP’s estimations, 85% of the Russian regions have just enough budget 
resources to cover expenditures envisaged by the federal laws. Also, the poorer the region, 
the less expenditure responsibilities dictated from the above it could finance. It should be 
noted that the estimated costs of expenditure responsibilities stipulated by the federal 
legislation alone are almost twice as much as the revenue capacity of the RF consolidated 
budget. As a result, federal legislative regulations are applied to only half of the population 
of the country.  
 
Only 5% of regional revenues received from the federal budget for earmarked purposes 
(see Figure 4) are intended for earmarked use in accordance with the Budget Code and are 
controlled by the Audit Chamber. The ostensibly non-earmarked nature of the rest of the 
revenues (own and shared taxes, equalization transfers) is a mere declaration since the 
regions have to spend them on unfunded mandates (as distinct from the mandates funded by 
subventions). Legal beneficiaries of public services are increasingly controlling spending of 
these funds. A good sign of our society moving in the direction of democracy are suits 
initiated by individuals against the authorities (mostly regional and local) demanding 
provision of public goods in accordance with federal legislation.  Spending of subnational 
governments is regulated by the federal center to such an extent that they have no 
independent policy to speak of. Neither are they responsible for their policy’s efficiency and 
coherency.   
 
                                                 
3 Here data on revenues and expenditures do not include extrabudgetary funds.  
Table 1. Assignment of Expenditures and Responsibilities in Education Sector in the 
Russian Federation (2002) 
 
Types of education F R M Legislative regulation   
Funding  Execution 
 
Pre-school education 1% 17% 82% F+R F,R,M М 
General basic and
secondary education 
1% 21% 79% F+R F,R,M М 
Primary and
secondary 
professional 
education 
62% 33% 5% F+R F,R,M 
? 
Retraining and
refresher courses 
40% 54% 6% F+R F,R,M ? 
Higher professional
education 
93% 6% 1% F+R F,R,M ? 
F – federal center, R – regions, M – municipal authorities, F,  R,  M – federal budget finances federal 
institutions, regional budget finances regional institutions, municipal budget finances municipal institutions 
? responsibilities are not assigned 
+  minimum standards are established by the federal center, additional – by regional or municipal 
governments. 
 
Source: laws reviewed by the Center for Fiscal Policy.4  
 
Even a cursory glance at Table 1 will show that one cannot judge the degree of 
decentralization relying merely on the share of each tier of government in the aggregate 
spending on the function. According to the figures in the first column, education to a great 
extent is financed by regional and local budgets.  However, it is evident from the next 
columns that legislative regulation of all types of education is carried out by the federal 
center. Also, the federal budget can participate in financing of any type of education (i.e. 
providing finance for departmental schools). Consequently, the role of the federal center in 
providing educational services is more pronounced than appears when one looks at its share 
in the costs of education.  
 
Table 2. Differences in Regional Expenditure Structure: Shares of Regional 
Consolidated Budgets Spent on Main Public Functions (2002) 
 
Line item in Budgetary Classification 
 Share of expenditures per function  
Median Maximum Minimum 
Government administration and local self-government 6,8 11,4 2,1 
Law enforcement and national security 3,2 5,3 1,0 
Industry, energy and construction 6,0 32,5 0,0 
Agriculture and fishery 2,3 9,4 0,1 
Transport, road sector, communication and informatics 1,0 4,8 0,0 
Housing and utilities 12,2 24,2 3,1 
Education 23,3 33,2 7,6 
                                                 
4 www.fpcenter.org 
Line item in Budgetary Classification 
 Share of expenditures per function  
Median Maximum Minimum 
Culture, arts and cinema 2,6 4,6 0,9 
Health care and physical culture 14,8 23,1 5,0 
Social programs 8,8 13,7 1,5 
 
Source: Reports on regional and local budgets execution as of January 1, 2002 (RF Ministry of Finance)  
 
Our analysis of revenue decentralization will be incomplete without information on 
actual spending of budget funds by the regions in compliance with the federal provisions.  
 
Despite a considerable portion of federal mandates in the budgets of the RF subjects and 
municipalities, Table 2 demonstrates great differences in the structure of expenditures of the 
regional consolidated budgets.  
 
The share of expenditures on education in the regional budgets varies from 8% to 33%, 
while the share of social programs fluctuates from 1.5% to 14%. Spending on economy (line 
items: Industry, energy and construction, Agriculture and fishery) in individual regions 
differs in a few tenfold. The data contained in the budget execution reports demonstrate that 
uniform federal standards are disregarded. One can see from Figure 3 that per capita 
spending on secondary education differs several times from region to region. However, 
almost everywhere it is above the conventional federal standard; also, practically nowhere 
the level of spending depends on the level of regional fiscal capacity.  
 
II. Revenues   
 
The share of revenues due to subfederal budgets is not a very reliable federalization 
indicator when subfederal authorities are denied the possibility to influence the revenues 
from most tax sources. One can see from Table 3 that subfederal budgets in the Russian 
Federation are much less independent as compared with other federative states though their 
share of tax revenues is larger.  
 
Figure 3. Per Pupil Spending on General (Secondary) Education in 2000 (adjusted 
for the service costs coefficient) 
Calculated by CFP on the basis of the RF Ministry of Finance’s data.  
 
 
Table 3. Subfederal Tax Revenue Structure Arranged According to the Degree of “Tax 
Discretion”* (%) 
Subfederal Tax Revenue Structure Arranged According to the Degree of “Tax Discretion”* 
Share of subfederal tax revenues arranged according to 
the degree of “tax discretion” Share of tax revenues due to regional and local budgets in the national consolidated budget 1 2 3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5 
Austria (1995) 
Federation subjects (lands) 
Municipalities 
19
8 
10 
 
9 
2 
 
11 
   
81 
98 
   
Germany (1995) 
Federation subjects (lands) 
Municipalities 
29
7 
22 
 
1 
 
52 
   
47 
100 
   
Spain (1995) 
Federation subjects (regions) 
Municipalities 
13
9 
5 
 
33 
15 
 
51 
7 
   
16 
78 
   
Mexico (1995) 
States 
Municipalities 
20
4 
16 
 
 
14 
    
 
86 
 
74 
  
26 
Switzerland (1995) 
Cantons 
Municipalities 
38
16 
22 
 
 
89 
 
97 
   
 
6 
 
3 
5 
  
Russian Federation (2002) 
Federation subjects  
Municipalities 
35
4 
31 
 
 
3 
 
19 
38 
   
 
 
15 
7 
 
65 
51 
 
1 
1 
Source: OECD Tax Policy Studies, Taxing Power of State and Local Government, 1999. Data for the 
Russian Federation calculated on the basis of regional and municipal budget execution reports as 
January 1, 2002.  
 
*Degree of tax discretion: 
1) Subnational governments set the tax rate and the tax base. 
2) Subnational governments set only the tax rate. 
3) Subnational governments set only the tax base. 
4) Shared taxes: 
4.1) tax shares are set by subnational governments; 
4.2) tax shares may be changed only with agreement of subnational governments; 
4.3) tax shares are envisaged by laws and may be changed unilaterally by the central government; 
4.4) tax shares are set by the central government every year in the budget law. 
5) The central government sets the tax rate and the tax base.  
 
** These are the final tax revenue allocation data. Data in parentheses indicate revenue allocation before shared 
taxes have been transferred to local governments from regional budgets.  
 
RF subjects receive 41 % of their tax revenues from shared taxes whose shares are divided 
among the tiers of the budgetary system in accordance with law on the federal budget. Actually, 
regional shares are changed every year on a plausible excuse (see Figure 4). Thus, the decision to 
collect 100% of VAT into the federal budget was theoretically and practically well founded (it 
has uneven tax base, is concentrated in the wealthiest regions and cannot be distributed in 
proportion to the value added produced in the regions). However, as a result, the regions had 
been deprived of the incomes on which they relied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Dynamics of Sharing Rates of Shared Taxes Due to RF Subjects (calculated by 
the CFP on the basis of the RF Ministry of Finance’s data) 
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The taxes that are split among the tiers of government in accordance with the federal laws 
provide 21% of tax revenues of subfederal budgets.  In this case also one cannot be absolutely 
sure that the federal center will not change the splitting ratio. Thus, the share of the tax on 
extraction of mineral resources due to the budgets of different levels was cut from 60% to 8% 
during the last two years though it was envisaged by federal legislation. That was a correct 
measure: since the tax base was uneven the tax should be concentrated in the federal budget to be 
used later to even fiscal capacity. But the revenues of Tyumen Oblast and other similar regions 
had been unexpectedly reduced without any adequate compensation. Is it possible to consider 
medium-term budgeting in such circumstances? The changed base and rate of the profits tax 
favored business but created unforeseen losses for the regional budgets because they received its 
greater portion.  
 
Regional and local taxes (35% of subfederal tax revenues) can be called so only nominally 
since the federal center decides where they are due (land tax), establishes tax benefits and 
privileges (property tax) and, which is most important, the time when they are imposed or 
cancelled. The latter decision is always unilateral and unexpected. It goes without saying that the 
local housing and utilities tax, being a turnover tax, contradicted the best practices of taxation. 
The federal center has abolished it. But then why should it be called a local tax? The regional 
sales tax, which the regions were made to impose, was abolished starting from this year in order 
to reduce the tax burden. But this is a policy conducted by the federal center, not the regions.  
Why should the latter pay for it?  
 
It should be noted that the above structure of regional revenue sources shows the average 
national level. Because revenue capacities of various RF regions differ dozen times, only some 
of them are relatively independent of the federal center. Own revenue sources of most regions 
play but insignificant role in their budgets. One can compare per capita fiscal capacity of the RF 
subjects in terms of various kinds of revenue and individual regional budgets dependence on 
them (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 also demonstrates an extremely high inequality of tax bases in some regions. Per 
capita tax revenues (before adjustment for costs of public services) of the wealthiest region 
(Yamal-Nenets AO) are 76 times higher than in the poorest region (Ingush Republic). If, in this 
situation, additional uniform splitting shares of shared taxes are assigned to all the RF subjects, 
thus achieving the 50:50 ratio of tax revenues (as envisaged in Article 48 of the Budget Code but 
suspended annually by the law on the federal budget), the gap among the regions in terms of tax 
capacity will become even wider. The said ratio can be achieved if 22% of VAT collected in a 
region is left there. However, in this case the difference in tax bases will be 80fold while federal 
budget revenues will decline by 11%, which in its turn will undermine the size of transfers 
allocated to the regions for equalization purposes. That is why the vertical allocation of tax 
revenues should be treated with great caution.  
Figure 5. Fiscal Capacity Compared in Terms of Own Revenues, Shared Taxes and Transfers in RF Subjects 
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The distributional evenness of tax bases of certain taxes across RF subjects should also be 
taken into account. This is the reason why the process of fiscal decentralization in Russia should 
concentrate on greater discretion of regional and local governments in terms of their revenue 
base rather than on increasing the share of tax revenues allocated to subnational budgets.  
 
Another indicator of the degree of public finance decentralization is the level of 
transparency, objectiveness and stability of transfer allocation to lower governments. In spite of 
the fact that starting from 2000 grants for fiscal capacity equalization have been allocated in 
accordance with the same formula, the regions cannot predict the size of transfers due to them in 
the next fiscal year.  
Figure 6. Structure of Federal Financial Assistance 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the CFP on the basis of relevant laws on the federal budget.  
 
The formula is undergoing the perfection procedure every year but still individual regions are 
deprived of up to 50% of transfers calculated by the previous year formula. The share of 
formula-based transfers (from the Fund for Financial Support of Regions and the Compensations 
Fund) has been declined recently (see Figure 5). Thus, apart from transfers from the five funds 
envisaged by the Budget Code, the regions will receive the following allocations in 2004:  
 
- for repayment of the federal budget debt for transferred housing, 
- stabilization subsidy, 
- for liquidation of consequences of natural disasters in agriculture,  
- additional financial assistance for the road construction to those regions where the road 
funds lack the necessary cash resulting from uneven receipt of oil products excises,  
- for compensation of losses resulting from annulment or centralization of some taxes, 
- subsidies to the regions where public employees’ wage increase was a substantial budget 
expenditure line item,  
- other subsidies whose purposes have not been specified in the law on the federal budget.  
 
According to the Ministry of Finance, there is a methodology behind these subsidies but it 
has not been made public yet. Such policy is a step back, towards the practice of approving 
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intergovernmental cash flows that has been recently abandoned by the federal center. Evidently, 
it will make regional governments more dependable on the federal center.  
 
 
III. Federative Reform in Terms of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
In 2003, a full-scale legislative reform was carried out in Russia marking a new stage of 
political and fiscal federalism in this country. The amendments to the laws on the organizational 
principles of government in the RF subjects and municipalities initiated by the presidential 
administration prepared the ground for a fundamental reform in the sphere of decentralization of 
state administration. Perhaps the most significant input made by the Presidential Commission on 
Clarifying the Assignment of Responsibilities Across the Levels of Government was the 
prohibition to impose unfunded mandates on lower governments.  The prohibition rests on 
recognizing the fact that the responsibilities of each level of government consist of three 
components: (1) regulation (setting rules), (2) provision of funds to support adopted decisions, 
and (3) actual execution of adopted decisions or organization of their execution.5 The relations 
between the budgets will depend on the type of combination in which these responsibilities are 
assigned to each level of government. The level of government that sets spending rules must also 
assume the responsibility for funding the relevant expenditures. If the federal center establishes 
the size of child allowances it must also provide the necessary earmarked funds to the lower 
governments and exercise control over their purposeful spending in the established amounts. If, 
according to the federal law, child allowances are to be paid at the discretion of the regions, then 
their amounts will be set by the latter depending on the actual revenues of their budgets.  
 
At the same time the Commission proposed to preserve the possibility of introduction by the 
federal center of the main priorities (quality standards) in public funds spending while the 
specific amounts of funds to be spent on such functions were to be established by laws of lower 
governments in compliance with the nature of the federative state. 
 
Unfunded mandates can be done away with in three ways. 
 
First, they can be supported by federal subventions. However, in this case the federal 
government will either have to cut other spending line items or, which is more probable, it will 
have to reassign practically all subfederal revenues and concentrate them at the federal level.  
 
Second, the federal center can abandon its requirements concerning specific amounts of 
funds to be allocated for such mandates by assigning this responsibility to the lower level. There 
is no doubt that social responsibilities declared by the federal center but unfulfilled in full extent 
by the regions will cause popular dissatisfaction to be dealt with by regional authorities.  
 
At last, the most radical and fair way to get rid of excessive responsibilities and unfunded 
mandates as far as the regions are concerned will be to annul all of them by federal laws. 
Concurrently with this, any RF subject will have the discretion to adopt similar measures of 
social protection depending on its financial situation. After the Commission’s work was over, 
new versions of the Law on General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) 
and Executive Bodies of State Power of the RF Subjects and the Law on General Principles of 
Local Self-government in the Russian Federation were adopted. They were followed by 
amendments to the Budget and Tax Codes submitted to the State Duma.  
 
                                                 
5 For further details see: Kurlyandskaya G.V., Andreeva E. I., Golovanova N. V., Assignment of Expenditure 
Responsibilities Among the Tiers of Government in the Russian Federation, Moscow, Academia, 2002 [in Russian]. 
As is evident from the analysis of the first law adopted in July 2003 as a result of the 
Commission’s work (On Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law On General Principles 
of Government in the Subjects of the Russian Federation) and amendments to other regulations, 
the unfunded mandates will be liquidated using all the three above ways with a particular stress 
made on the second one.  
 
The new edition of the Law on General Principles of Organization of Legislative 
(Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the RF Subjects provides a clear 
assignment of responsibilities regarding the matters over which the federal center and the RF 
subjects have joint jurisdiction. Under the law, there are only three options of responsibilities 
assignment:  
 
(1) The exclusive jurisdiction option: all the components of the responsibilities 
(legislative regulation, funding and execution) are to be assigned to the same level of 
government, as is the case, for example, with national defense. At the same time one 
cannot think of any other matter in the exclusive jurisdiction of a RF subject that will 
add to the list (Article 263) of “powers of the government of a RF subject regarding 
the matters that are in the joint jurisdiction in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation”.  
(2) The joint jurisdiction option: the priorities/standards of budget expenditures are 
established at the federal level while the regional governments are responsible for 
their regulation, funding and actual execution. The education function can serve as a 
classical example of joint jurisdiction. Under the Law, the regulation, funding and 
organization of provision of higher education are the responsibility of the federal 
center, which means that in practice this function has fallen into its exclusive 
jurisdiction. Regarding professional and technical training and general education, the 
federal center may only set general standards while the specific regulation of their 
provision; their funding and organization are assigned to the RF subjects.  
The most radical change, however, envisaged by the Law is that the federal center is 
no longer responsible for the regulation (i.e., setting the volume and the provision 
procedure) of social protection measures to a number of population categories; from 
now on this is the responsibility of the RF subjects.  
(3) The delegated responsibility option: the legislative regulation and financial support 
are assigned to the higher level of government while the execution of a function 
together with earmarked funds is delegated to the lower level. The federal center 
delegates the function of paying allowances and benefits to war veterans to the 
regional level and provides earmarked funding for this purpose.  
 
Another result of the Commission’s work is the radical rewriting of Chapter 11 of the Budget 
Code dealing with the assignment of expenditure responsibilities among the levels of 
government. It will no longer include the list of expenditures to be made by each level of 
government. Instead, each level of government will spend funds in accordance with the 
expenditure responsibilities assigned to it by law. It is recommended to stipulate in the Budget 
Code the prohibition to impose unfunded mandates on the lower governments. After legislative 
annulment of unfunded mandates and bringing federal provisions regulating expenditure 
responsibilities in accordance with the budget revenues, the expenditure side of budgets of any 
level will be formulated on the basis of all current laws. In order to bring together all the 
expenditure responsibilities of each level of government the Budget Code will include a 
provision under which each level of government will form its Register of Expenditure 
Responsibilities. This will be a kind of an inventory established by sectoral laws that will 
become the basis for formulating the expenditure side of the budget for the next fiscal year. Such 
registers should become the basis for further legislative amendments aimed at better assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities and annihilation of unfunded mandates.  
 
However, the above laws undergoing the amending procedure will not attain the goals 
formulated by the Commission unless they are not accompanied with appropriate amendments to 
a number of sectoral laws. Approximately some 100 such law need to be changed in order to 
provide a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities, determine financial liability of each 
level of government for decisions adopted by it and to do away with unfunded mandates. These 
laws are to be harmonized not only with the aforementioned federal laws but also with the 
revenue capacity of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. According to the 
Commission’s findings, the current federal laws impose excessive expenditure responsibilities on 
the governments. As was mentioned earlier, the current responsibilities of the RF budgetary 
system need twice as much funds as the available resources and will have to be cut for the 
system of expenditure assignment to work properly.  
 
Along with the expenditure assignment, the Commission also developed recommendations 
on revenue sources assignment. Unfortunately, its recommendations have not surpassed the 
ideological framework of the tax policy pursued by the central government. This policy 
conducted in the interests of Russian business community and taxpayers and aiming at making 
the tax system and its administration easier and simpler still does not take into account the 
federative nature of the Russian state. However, in a federative state each level of government 
should have real powers to generate and manage its own revenues.  The Commission’s 
recommendations on revenue power assignment concerned only the amount and type of tax 
revenues to be given to each level of government for it to be able to support its expenditure 
responsibilities. Under the current tax system this means setting splitting shares of shared taxes. 
As a result, the Tax Code will not be amended. Progressive amendments will be made only to the 
Budget Code where regional and municipal splitting shares of federal taxes will be envisaged.   
 
 
IV. Prospects of Federative Reform Realization 
 
After adoption of the Law on Making Amendments and Alterations to the Federal Law on 
General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State 
Power of the RF Subjects, the new State Duma and the Federation Council become responsible 
for bringing the total of the current laws in harmony with the new concept of federative relations. 
Under the Law, the issues falling within the responsibilities of a RF subject within the matters in 
joint jurisdiction should be the “discretion of this RF subject and receive its financial support 
(with the exception of federal subventions)”. To follow the reform’s logic, the federal 
government must stop regulating the execution of these responsibilities while the regions will 
have to develop own laws establishing the details of the procedure and volume of public goods 
to be delivered in the course of realization of these responsibilities. The RF subjects will have the 
weighty responsibility to deliver social support and social services to the population. From now 
on the regions will provide for the social protection of the following categories of population in 
their laws: 
- elderly citizens, 
- invalids, 
- citizens in difficult circumstances, 
- orphans, homeless children and those without parental care (with the exception of 
children in federal educational institutions), 
- veterans of labor, citizens who worked on the home front during the Great Patriotic War 
of 1941-45, 
- families with children (including those with many children and single parents), 
- victims of political repressions, 
- low-income citizens. 
 
For the regions to be able to pursue their own independent social policy, as is envisaged 
by the new Law, the regional unfunded mandates should be liquidated. For this purpose, 
quite a number of laws should be changed radically including the following: 
- On Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions, 
- On Veterans, 
- On State Allowances to Citizens with Children, 
- On Social Services Provided to Elderly Citizens and Invalids, 
- On Social Protection of Invalids in the Russian Federation, 
- On the Fundamental Principles of Social Services Provided to Population, 
- On State Social Support, etc. 
 
It looks like not an easy thing to do. Politicians will have to abandon their habitual populism 
and say honestly that regional budgets gave no funds for the social assistance measures declared 
by the federal center (of which only 50% are fulfilled). Who will dare to annul all the national 
guarantees to invalids and repression victims? What about the very status of an invalid or a 
repression victim? Surely enough, one cannot be an invalid in one region and a healthy person in 
another. But, strictly speaking, recognizing a person to be an invalid at the federal level will 
cause an unfunded mandate to the regions.  
 
Are the authors of the reform aware of its scale? – Soon we will know about this. Right now, 
some 90 laws are being worked at by a team set up specifically for this purpose. 
 
As far as the amendments are concerned, regional authorities will be bear even more 
responsibility: they will have to develop and adopt own laws to regulate their social policies. The 
most rational decision seems to recommend to the RF subjects to include the relevant legislative 
norms in a single Social Code. The same can apply to the federal authorities as well since the 
current regulations are quite different and contradictory and are often included in various laws.  
 
What will be the response from the RF subjects? Will they be bold enough and reduce by 
50% the social guarantees currently provided by the federal laws? If not, they will have to 
support them from their own budgets and stop charging the federal center for the lack of funds.  
 
The interpretation of the Law On General Principles of Organization of Bodies of Power in 
the RF Subjects causes some suspicions. According to our sources,  federal officials who 
develop amendments to sectoral laws are quite eager to assign funding of expenditure 
responsibilities to the levels of government and forget about those articles where social support 
funding standards and rendering procedures are established (e.g. free of charge services, list of 
institutions rendering individual services, regulation of activities of staff engaged in provision of 
social services).  
 
It is a pity that social policy becoming a responsibility of regional authorities is not 
accompanied with greater powers in the tax sphere. Greater expenditure powers should be 
balanced with more authority to expand tax base and set tax rates. People have the right to be 
sure that the level of taxation established by the legislative authorities is adequate to the level 
and volume of public services also established by them. This is the only way to make the 
authorities accountable for their policies to the people, not to the higher government. At last, the 
electorate will realize that it is they who pay for elected officials and for public goods. 
 
And this will hasten the arrival of civil society. 
